“From the height of their privilege, economic experts discussed inflation as a matter of imbalance between demand and supply in the economy, ultimately boiling down to peoples’ moral deficiency. Having fought for and obtained higher wages, workers were unable to control themselves and indulged in extravagant behavior, evidenced by “conspicuous increases in unnecessary consumption of alcoholic beverages, sweets, chocolate, and biscuits,” as economics professor Luigi Einaudi sneered. With similar disdain, Maffeo Pantaleoni, pioneer of today’s mainstream economics, blamed inflation on workers who “live like pigs in their homes in order to waste the greatest part of their income in wine at the tavern.””
Clara E. Mattei · Escape from Capitalism, 13

My reflection In the 1920s, vice was increasingly understood as pathology. This marked a major shift: working-class problems that were once labeled as sins or sources of moral disorder came to be seen as diseases or signs of social and biological degeneration. The move from a moral to a medical framework expanded the reach of interventions. Instead of simply condemning individuals, authorities now used medical diagnoses to justify more intrusive interventions, including surveillance, exclusion, and criminological control. Ruth D. Harris (1991) demonstrates how the disease model of alcoholism became closely linked to working-class men, reinforcing stereotypes of the morally depraved and biologically degenerate worker. Similarly, N. Kamenov explores whether interwar policies around alcoholism and vice represented social medicine or racial hygiene, showing that the language and logic of social medicine could easily slip into the rhetoric of racial hygiene in this era. For example, by 1925, drunkenness was officially classified as a "Social Disease." Thus, these scholars show that medicalization did not remove stigma but provided broader justification for state intervention and control.
In mid-century, pathology becomes culture. A culture of poverty replaced biological defect with socialized defect: People experiencing poverty supposedly reproduce norms that keep them poor. As J. L. Roach and Orville R. Gursslin 1967 argue, there is less openly stigmatized vocabulary, but it could still reverse causality. Roach and Gursslin found the concept logically and empirically deficient because it often treated poverty as the result rather than the cause of social behaviors, without sufficient evidence that cultural traits alone explained persistent poverty. Their empirical review showed that structural factors like material deprivation, unemployment, and lack of resources played a much larger role, and they argued that the culture of poverty model neglected these variables and failed to account for the complexity of socioeconomic disadvantage. Consequently, they concluded that material deprivation deserved greater explanatory weight.
And today, culture becomes a mechanism. As Servaas Storm (2024) argues, "Wage-push inflation" and the "wage-price spiral" translate conflict over distribution into an apparently neutral causal chain: workers seek higher pay; costs rise; prices rise; restraint becomes necessary. The main argument for the wage-price spiral model is that when wages increase, businesses pass on these costs as higher prices, fueling further wage demands and creating an ongoing cycle of inflation. Proponents see this mechanism as a central explanation for rising prices in periods of strong labor demand. On the other hand, critics argue that this model oversimplifies complex inflation dynamics, often overlooks the roles of corporate pricing power and supply shocks, and tends to assign disproportionate blame to workers. In the pandemic-era debate, Bernanke and Blanchard’s weight dynamic model has been criticized for obscuring distributional questions and legitimating more monetary tightening than the evidence warrants. Alternative explanations, such as those by Ho‑fung Hung and D. Thompson, link inflation's rise and fall to the shifting balance of power between labor and capital, rather than attributing it primarily to wage or monetary dynamics. These scholars emphasize that broader structural and political factors can shape inflationary outcomes in ways the wage-price spiral framework does not fully capture.
The current US context makes the old rhetoric unusually consequential because the word "affordability" is politically central, while the underlying distributional story is easy to hide. As Pew's July 2026 survey showed, 29% of registered voters named the economy as the issue they most wanted congressional candidates to discuss, including 15% naming cost of living or affordability. Neither party held a clear advantage on economic policy. This opens a large rhetorical market for explanations that sound technical but assign responsibility too quickly. For instance, politicians may refer to “supply and demand imbalances” or cite the need for “market corrections” as reasons for rising housing costs, rather than acknowledging the effects of wage stagnation or corporate consolidation. Similarly, terms like “core inflation” or “transitory shock” are often used in debate, focusing attention on economic mechanisms while leaving underlying questions about income distribution unaddressed. These examples illustrate how technical language can obscure who benefits and who bears the cost in key political debates.
We live in a precarious era when the poverty side of today's USA is equally important. The Georgetown Center on Poverty and Equality reports that 43.7 million Americans experienced poverty in 2024. It emphasizes that joblessness, illness, family separation, and caregiving can push households into poverty; it also notes that the temporary expansion of the child tax credit drove a sharp fall in child poverty before the recession reversed much of the gain. These findings suggest that policy interventions like the child tax credit can directly and significantly reduce poverty rates, especially among children. The reversal of anti-poverty gains after the credit's expiration underscores the importance of sustained and well-targeted policies in addressing the root causes of poverty, rather than relying solely on short-term measures.

Aphorism A diagnosis can be a moral judgment wearing a lab coat.
Sticky idea If the remedy disciplines only labor, the explanation is distributional.
Connection This parallel is eye-opening because it shows a repeated pattern in how social problems are framed and addressed. My main argument is that, both historically and today, policymakers have used assumptions about personal character to justify strict conditions for public support. The old approach was "drinking proves defective character," so the solution was to control the drinker. Now, a similar logic applies: "poverty proves insufficient work effort," leading to policies that require people to report work activities or risk losing essential benefits like food or health assistance. Georgetown describes the work requirement as a set of paperwork-heavy policies that have stripped Medicaid coverage without increasing employment, while noting that more than 90% of adults under 65 with Medicaid already work full or part-time. This reflects a continuing trend of imposing harsh requirements on those who need support, despite evidence that most are already meeting those expectations.
Deep Thinking When working-class groups act—whether by drinking, refusing deprivation, or demanding a higher wage—their actions rely on public support; that action is recorded as evidence of a defect in the group. For example, the labor strikes of the early 20th century, such as the 1912 Lawrence Textile Strike, were often portrayed as dangerous or irrational mob behavior rather than responses to unsafe conditions and low pay. Similarly, temperance movements, which arose from struggles with poverty and exploitative labor conditions, were recast by social critics as signs of moral failing among the working class. Vice becomes disease, poverty becomes culture, and bargaining becomes inflationary pressure.
The rhetoric is powerful because it preserves the appearance of scientific neutrality while changing the question from "What conditions produce this response?" and "Who controls those conditions?" to "What is wrong with the people responding?" As Michel Foucault observed in his analysis of power and knowledge, such discourses often function to pathologize the behaviors of marginalized groups and obscure the structural forces at play. Similarly, Antonio Gramsci argued that dominant groups maintain control not just through economic means but also by shaping cultural narratives, shifting the focus from systemic issues to individual deficiencies.
A deep thinker tests this by conducting a diagnostic test, which in this context means critically examining whether an explanation focuses more on the responses of marginalized groups than on the forces or decisions that shaped those responses. Here, 'diagnostic test' refers to the analytical process of asking: does this model explain the suffering, resistance, or behaviors of the powerless more thoroughly than it explains the power structures that created those conditions in the first place? If it does, it is probably doing 'moral work' in technical language. In other words, it is subtly passing moral judgment by presenting biased interpretations as neutral or scientific analysis.
Why this matters now The habit of making prices a question of conduct did not end in the 1920s. On February 4, 2022, Bank of England Governor Andrew Bailey told BBC Radio 4 that the Bank wanted "quite clear restraint in the bargaining process because otherwise, it will get out of control." Asked whether that meant workers should not demand big raises, he said, "Broadly, yes," and admitted, "That is painful" (Fortune). His reasoning was that unchecked wage growth would deepen inflation. On April 25, 2023, the Bank's chief economist, Huw Pill, said that "someone needs to accept that they're worse off," and he aimed that at firms raising prices as well as at pay demands (Fortune).

The euro area record points elsewhere. On June 27, 2023, ECB President Christine Lagarde said unit profits "contributed around two-thirds to domestic inflation in 2022," about double their usual share, while "workers have so far lost out" (ECB). Asking restraint of the people who already lost ground is Einaudi's old burden, in newer vocabulary.

Sources checked September 25, 2026.

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